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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 




This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal brought by Allegheny 
County, Pennsylvania, from an order entered in the District Court on March 20, 2009, 
granting summary judgment to the six appellees, each of whom had been convicted of 
committing a sex offense requiring registration as a sex offender under Pennsylvania=s 
Megan=s Law, in this action in which appellees challenged the validity of Allegheny 
County Ordinance, No. 39-07-OR, entitled AResidence Requirements, Registered Sex 
Offenders,@ on various federal grounds and the state law ground that Pennsylvania law 
preempts the ordinance.  The ordinance limits the places where sex offenders can reside 
within the County by precluding them from residing within 2,500 feet of child care 
facilities, community centers, public parks, recreation facilities, or schools.  The District 
Court held that the ordinance conflicts with Pennsylvania statutory law establishing a 
statewide system for supervising sex offenders following their release from prison.  Thus, 
the Court held that state law preempted the ordinance and it did not decide the federal 
questions.  Fross v. County of Allegheny, 612 F. Supp. 2d 651 (W.D. Pa. 2009).  
Consequently, under the District Court=s opinion and order, the ordinance is not 
enforceable. 
 Following the entry of the summary judgment, the County advised appellees that it 
intended to appeal.  Consequently, appellees sought and obtained an order on April 2, 
2009, from the District Court permitting it to file an application for counsel fees and costs 
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within 30 days of the exhaustion of all appeals.1
 After having read the briefs and submissions of the parties, considering their oral 
arguments, and reviewing applicable Pennsylvania law, we concluded that the appeal 
raised important and unresolved questions of the enforceability of county and local 
ordinances restricting the places at which sex offenders may reside within jurisdictions 
adopting such ordinances.  We also concluded that the case, though dealing with an 
ordinance effective in only one county, was of state-wide importance inasmuch as other 
counties and municipalities might adopt similar ordinances, particularly if the County 
prevailed on this appeal.  Furthermore, we concluded that even though we had 
jurisdiction to decide the appeal, we could not issue an opinion that would be binding on 
courts throughout Pennsylvania but that it was important that such an opinion be 
rendered.  We recognized, however, that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania could issue 
an opinion that would be binding on a state-wide basis.  Accordingly, we certified the 
question of whether Pennsylvania law preempts the ordinance to the Supreme Court of 
  The County then appealed.  The District 
Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367 and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s order, see 
Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 2009), subject, however, 
to the binding effect of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that we 
describe below.   
                                                 
1That order did not affect the finality of the order of March 20, 2009, for appeal purposes. 
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Pennsylvania pursuant to the certification procedure outlined in this Court=s Local 
Appellate Rule Misc. 110 and Internal Operating Procedure 10.9 and the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania=s Internal Operating Procedure Rule 10 and requested that the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania grant the petition for certification.  In particular, we certified the 
question to the Supreme Court in the following form: 
Is Allegheny County Ordinance No. 39-07-01 entitled ‘Residence 
Requirements; Registered Sex Offenders’ preempted by Pennsylvania 
statutory law and the procedures of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation 
and Parole? 
 
At that time, notwithstanding the certification, we retained jurisdiction of the appeal 
pending resolution of our petition.  On June 3, 2010, the Supreme Court granted the 
petition for certification and thus we have continued to retain jurisdiction over the appeal 
without deciding it. 
 On May 25, 2011, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania answered the certified 
question in an opinion which, after a comprehensive review of Pennsylvania law, 
concluded as follows: 
The County’s legislative effort in this instance undermines the General 
Assembly’s policies of rehabilitation, reintegration, and diversion from 
prison of appropriate offenders, and significantly interferes with the 
operation of the Sentencing and Parole Codes.  For these reasons, we agree 
with the federal district court that the County’s Ordinance stands as an 
obstacle to accomplishing the full purposes [and] objectives of the General 
Assembly and is, therefore, preempted. 
 
Fross v. County of Allegheny, 20 A.3d 1193, ____ (Pa. 2011). 
                                                                                                                                                             
 See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 108 S.Ct. 1717 (1988).   
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 When we received the Supreme Court opinion our Clerk directed the parties to file 
letter briefs commenting on the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision.  The parties have 
filed those briefs and are in agreement that the Supreme Court’s decision should lead us 
to affirm the District Court’s decision and order of March 20, 2009, and we agree with 
them on this point.  Furthermore, the parties agree that we can remand the issue of 
appellees’ request for attorneys’ fees and costs for the proceedings in the District Court to 
that Court for resolution, though appellees contend that alternatively we could retain 
jurisdiction over the attorneys’ fees and costs issue and decide it ourselves.  We reject 
appellees’ alternative suggestion because the District Court is more familiar than are we 
with the proceedings in that Court and thus it should pass on the attorneys’ fees and cost 
issues in the proceedings before it. 
 For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the order of March 20, 2009, and will 
remand the case to the District Court for resolution of the attorneys’ fees and costs issues 
for the proceedings in that Court.  We, however, will tax costs against the County in this 
Court. 
